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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Proposition 8, the Fair Pricing for Dialysis Act, seeks to ensure that outpatient dialysis 
clinics provide quality and affordable patient care to people suffering from end stage renal 
disease.1 Specifically, Proposition 8 has three key provisions: (1) to limit chronic dialysis clinics’ 
revenue and require clinics to refund profits above the limit, (2) to require clinics to submit an 
annual report to the state government, and (3) to prohibit clinics from refusing to treat patients 
based on the source of payment for care.2  
A YES vote on this measure will require dialysis clinics to issue refunds for revenue 
above 115 percent of the costs of direct patient care and healthcare improvements. Clinics that do 
not issue the required refunds will be fined.3 It will also require clinics to report their revenues to 
the state and will ensure that patients are not denied care based on their insurance status. 
A NO vote allows dialysis clinics to continue to charge group and individual health 
insurers multiple times what government programs pay for dialysis treatment. 
A pre-election review identified constitutional concerns that may also be litigated post-




A. Dialysis Treatment 
 
Dialysis is a medical treatment that removes waste products and excess fluids and 
chemicals from a person's bloodstream. Individuals with kidney failure may receive dialysis 
treatment. Dialysis artificially mimics what healthy kidneys do. Most people on dialysis undergo 
hemodialysis treatment which lasts about four hours and typically occurs three times per week.  
Dialysis patients may receive dialysis treatment at home or at a hospital, but most patients 
receive treatment at chronic dialysis clinics (CDCs). The California Department for Public 
Health (CDPH) is responsible for licensing and inspecting CDCs. Two private for-profit entities, 
DaVita Inc. and Fresenius Medical Care, operate and have at least partial ownership of the 
majority (72%) of CDCs in California.  
 
B. Paying for Dialysis Treatment 
 
CDCs have total revenues of roughly $3 billion annually from their operations in 
California. These revenues consist of payments for dialysis from a few main sources: Medicare, 
Medi-Cal, and Group and Individual Health Insurance.  
                                               
1 Cal. Proposition 8 at § 2 (2018). 
2 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL 
ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2018, at 48–55, available at 
https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2018/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf [“NOVEMBER 2018 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
3 California Proposition 8, Limits on Dialysis Clinics’ Revenue and Required Refunds Initiative (2018), Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_8,_Limits_on_Dialysis_Clinics%27_Revenue_and_Required_Refund








Medicare is a federally funded program that provides health coverage to most people age 
65 and older and certain younger people who have disabilities.4 Federal law generally makes 
people with kidney failure eligible for Medicare coverage regardless of age or disability status. 




Medi-Cal is California’s federal-state Medicaid program. Medi-Cal provides health 
coverage to low-income people.6 The state and federal government share the costs of Medi-Cal. 
For people that qualify for both Medicare and Medi-Cal, Medicare covers most of the payment 
for dialysis treatment as the primary payer and Medi-Cal covers the rest.7 For people only 
covered by Medi-Cal, the Medi-Cal program is solely responsible to pay for dialysis treatment.8 
 
3. Group and Individual Health Insurance 
 
Group and individual health insurance coverage is often provided by a private insurer that 
receives a premium payment in exchange for covering the costs of an agreed-upon set of health 
care services. When an insured person develops kidney failure, that person can usually transition 
to Medicare coverage.9 Federal law requires that a group insurer remain the primary payer for 
dialysis treatment for a “coordination period” that lasts 30 months.10 
Group and individual health insurance typically pay higher rates for dialysis than 
government programs11. Medicare and Medi-Cal rates for dialysis treatment are largely 
determined by federal and state regulations.12,13On the other hand, group and individual health 
insurers establish their rates by negotiating with CDCs. On average, group and individual 
insurers pay multiple times what government programs pay for dialysis treatment.14 
Once a person is eligible for Medicare for kidney dialysis treatment, there will be a 
“coordination period” when the employer or union health group plan will continue to pay the 
employee or plan member’s health care bills. If the employer or union health group plan doesn’t 
                                               






10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services promulgate regulations on Medicare payments for renal dialysis 
services, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ESRDpayment/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2018).  
13 Cal. Welf. & Inst. §14105 authorizes the Director of State Department of Health Services to limit the rates of 
payment for health care services and adopt rules and regulations for carrying out the Medi-Cal program.   
14 See NOVEMBER 2018 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2. 
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pay 100% of costs, Medicare may pay some of the remaining costs. During the “coordination 
period”, the employer or union health group plan “pays first” and Medicare “pays second.”15  
If a self-payer meets the eligibility requirements for Medicare, they may be eligible for 
12 months retroactive coverage.16 To help with costs not covered by Medicare, patients can get a 
secondary source of coverage through Medigap or Medicaid. If no secondary insurance is 
available, the patient will incur out of pocket costs.17  
Uninsured patients would be subject to out of pocket costs. The cost of dialysis treatment 
varies depending on where treatment is received. If emergency dialysis treatment is received at a 
hospital, a single treatment could be $9,900. If a single dialysis treatment is received at a clinic, 
the same treatment could cost $500. The annual cost of hemodialysis treatment at a clinic is 
about $89,000. Costs for dialysis treatment are increasing.18 
 
III. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE LAW 
 
Although there have not been identical legislative attempts to regulate the revenue of 
CDCs, the topic of dialysis treatment has been one that has garnered legislative attention. There 
have been previous attempts by the Legislature to improve patient care for dialysis patients and 
to ensure that income to dialysis centers is directed to patient care, not corporate profit, for 
instance:  
 
A. AB 251 Health and care facilities: dialysis clinics. (2017-2018) 19 
 
In 2017, AB 251 was amended to establish a medical loss ratio for chronic dialysis 
clinics.  The medical loss ratio would require the clinics to spend at least 85% of their revenue on 
direct patient care, health care quality improvement, and taxes and license fees.  Clinics that do 
not meet this ratio would be required to issue rebates to non-government payers in an amount 
sufficient to meet the minimum spending of 85%.20 Services Employees International Union 
(SEIU) California, which sponsored the bill, stated that the bill would “incentivize quality care 
and rein in the price of dialysis treatment by requiring CDCs to spend at least 85% of their 
revenue on direct patient care expenses, quality improvements, taxes and licensure fees.”21  
However, AB 251 failed to move forward as a dialysis clinics bill and was subsequently 
amended to include a completely unrelated set of legislative changes. 
 
 
                                               
15 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Coverage of Kidney Dialysis and Kidney Transplant 
Services, https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/10128-Medicare-Coverage-ESRD.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).   
16 Id.   
17 Id.  
18 Specialty Management Care, The Annual Kidney Dialysis Cost in USA. https://www.specialtycm.com/annual-
kidney-dialysis-cost-usa/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
19 On August 6, 2018, AB 251 was gutted and amended to Bar pilots: pilotage rates. (2017-2018) 
20 See Official California Legislative Information Assembly Bill 251, Analysis by Senate Committee on Health 
(Sept. 18, 2018), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB251.  
21 Id.  
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B. SB 349 Chronic dialysis clinics: staffing requirements. (2017-2018).22  
 
In 2017, SB 349 was introduced. Initially, the bill set out requirements for minimum 
staffing ratios for dialysis clinics and minimum transition time between dialysis patients. The 
purpose of this bill, as introduced, was “to improve the quality of patient care at dialysis centers 
by increasing frequency of inspections, requiring a higher level of staffing, and imposing a 
minimum transition time between patients at dialysis machines.”23 In August 2018, the dialysis 
language was completely removed from SB 349 and it became a bill to protect people from civil 
arrest when visiting California courthouses.  
In response to SB 349 in its original form, SEIU-United Healthcare Workers West 
(SEIU-UHW) President Dave Regan stated:  
 
“This legislation has successfully raised awareness of the disturbing patient care 
problems in dialysis clinics that the industry claimed were not happening, and we are 
eager to have productive discussions to find solutions that improve patient care for the 
66,000 Californians who need dialysis to survive. If the discussions are not productive, 
we will ask California voters to stand up for dialysis patients through a statewide ballot 
initiative planned for the November 2018 election.”24  
 
California Chamber of Commerce “opposed SB 349 because it would have significantly 
increased health care costs, reduced the availability of dialysis clinics and patient shifts at clinics 
and resulted in job losses with no clear evidence of a clinical benefit to patients.”25   
 
C. California Limits on Charges for Dialysis and Minimum Staffing of Clinics 
Initiative (#17-0015)26  
 
Following the failure of SB 349 and AB 251, the proponents drafted two initiatives for 
the November 2018 ballot. One was the “California Limits on Charges for Dialysis and 
Minimum Staffing of Clinics Initiative (#17-0015)” and the other was the current Proposition 8, 
the “Fair Pricing for Dialysis Act.” SEIU decided to focus the signature collection on Proposition 
8 and not the measure that was more directed to staffing concerns.27 
 
 
                                               
22 On August 24, 2018 SB 349 was gutted and amended, and transformed to Courthouses: Privilege from civil 
arrest. (2017-2018) 
23 See also Official California Legislative Information Senate Bill 349, Analysis by Assembly Appropriations (Sept. 
18, 2018), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB349.  
24 J W August, Questions About Patient Safety in Kidney Dialysis Clinics,  NBC 7 SAN DIEGO (Dec. 20, 2017). 
https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Questions-About-Patient-Safety-in-Kidney-Dialysis-Clinics-
465078823.html. 
25  Karen Sarkissian, Dialysis Clinic Staffing Ratio Bill Stopped, California Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 11, 2017). 
https://advocacy.calchamber.com/2017/09/11/dialysis-clinic-staffing-ratio-bill-stopped/. 
26 California Limits on Charges for Dialysis and Minimum Staffing of Clinics Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Limits_on_Charges_for_Dialysis_and_Minimum_Staffing_of_Clinics_Initiative_(
2018). (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) [“Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Act”]; 
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/17-0015%20%28Dialysis%20Clinic%20Care%29_0.pdf.  
27 Id.  
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D. Ohio Initiative 
 
A similar initiative measure was circulated in Ohio, called “The Ohio Limits on Dialysis 
Clinics' Revenue and Required Refunds Initiative.”28 The measure will not appear on the Ohio 
ballot as an initiative constitutional amendment on November 6, 2018. The initiative petition was 
ruled invalid by the Ohio Supreme Court because documentation required for managing paid 
signature gatherers was not filed prior to signature gathering by paid circulators. 
 
IV. THE LAW 
 
A. Existing Law 
 
Health and Safety code, Division 2 (Licensing Provisions), Chapter 1 (Clinics), Article 3 
(Regulations) provides regulations for clinics including chronic dialysis clinics. Health and 
Safety Code, Division 2 (Licensing Provisions), Chapter 2 (Health Facilities), Article 2 
(Administration) provides that the health care facilities pay fees to the Licensing and 
Certification Division to fund the administration of the state programs. Except with Medicare 
and Medi-Cal reimbursements, current law does not limit how much chronic dialysis clinics can 
charge.  
 
B. Proposed Law 
 
This measure adds section 1226.7, 1226.8, and 1266.3 to the Health and Safety Code. 
1226.7(a)(2)(B) requires CDCs to issue rebates to payers, excluding Medicare and other 
government payers, in the amount that revenues exceed the cap.  Section 1226.7(a)(1) caps 
revenue for dialysis clinics at 115 percent of specified “direct patient care services costs” and 
“health care quality improvement costs.” Such “allowable” costs include the costs of staff wages 
and benefits, staff training and development, drugs and medical supplies, facilities, and 
electronic health information systems.29 Allowable costs are costs that can be counted toward 
determining the revenue cap. Other costs, such as administrative overhead, would not be counted 
toward the revenue cap. This measure allows CDPH to identify through regulation additional 
CDC costs that would count as allowable costs, which could serve to reduce the amount of any 
rebates otherwise owed by CDCs.30  
The measure also provides a process for the CDCs to challenge the revenue cap 
number.31  A CDC must prove that the cap of 115 percent will violate due process or effect a 
taking of private property requiring just compensation.32 First, a CDC can propose a new revenue 
cap. Then, a CDC must prove that any whole number below the proposed cap will not violate 
due process or effect a taking of private property requiring just compensation. If the court 
                                               
28 Ohio Limits on Dialysis Clinics' Revenue and Required Refunds Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Limits_on_Dialysis_Clinics%27_Revenue_and_Required_Refunds_Initiative_(2018) 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2018) [“Ohio Initiative Ballotpedia”]. 
29 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.7(c)(1) and (3) (2018).  
30 Id.  
31 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.7(a)(6) (2018).  
32 Id.  
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determines the proposed cap is the lowest whole number that will not violate due process or 
effect a taking, the proposed cap will apply for only one year.  
The measure also requires CDCs to pay interest on the rebate amounts, calculated from 
the date of treatment.33 CDCs would be required to pay a penalty to CDPH of five percent of the 
amount of any required rebates, up to a maximum penalty of $100,000.34 Rebates would be 
calculated at the level of a CDCs “governing entity,” which refers to the entity that owns or 
operates the CDC (“owner/operator”).  
Proposition 8 requires CDCs to submit annual reports to CDPH.35 These reports would 
include the number of dialysis treatments provided, the amount of allowable costs, the amount of 
the owner/operator’s revenue cap, the amount by which revenues exceed the cap, and the amount 
of rebates paid.36  
Finally, the measure prohibits CDCs from refusing to provide treatment to a person based 
on the source of payment for care.37 A clinic cannot choose to treat a patient with private 
insurance instead of a patient with government insurance. 
The California Department of Public Health would issue regulations to implement and 
enforce this measure.38 The Department would review the annual reports and determine the 
amount of penalties for violations.  Proposition 8 delegates the power to prescribe additional 
categories of “direct patient care services” and “health care quality improvement costs” to the 
CDPH.39 Also, since the surrounding sections in the Health and Safety Code define “department” 
as the Department of Public Health, it is likely that a court or other body interpreting the measure 
would find “department” to be the California Department of Public Health.  
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
  
A. Taking private property without fair legal proceedings 
 
Both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution prohibit the 
government from taking private property (which includes the value of a business) without fair 
legal proceedings. A CDC may prove in court that, in its particular situation, the required rebates 
would amount to taking the value of the business and therefore violate the state or federal 
constitution. If a CDC owner/operator is able to prove this, the measure outlines a process where 
the court would reduce the required rebates by just enough to no longer violate the constitution.  
In Section 1226.7 (a)(6), the proposition recognizes that the terms of the initiative may 
lead to violations of the state and federal constitution. It sets up a process to avoid 
unconstitutional takings. The U.S. Constitution and California Constitution provide that private 
                                               
33 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.7(a)(2)(E) (2018).  
34 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.7(a)(4) (2018). 
35 Cal. Proposition 8 at § 1226.7(b) (2018). 
36 Id.  
37 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.8(a) (2018). 
38 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.7(a)(4) (2018). 
39 Cal. Proposition 8 at § 1226.7(c)(1) and (3) (2018). 
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property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”40 A regulatory action 
will be deemed a per se taking for Fifth Amendment purposes when a government regulation 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of his or her property or completely 
deprives the owner of “all economically beneficial use” of his or her property.41   
The rebate requirement of Proposition 8 may be subject to both facial and as-applied 
challenges. To determine whether the adoption of a regulation affects a taking, a court must 
consider: (1) Does the regulation substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest?; and 
(2) Does the regulation deprive the owner of economically viable use of property?42 The 
existence of a “regulatory taking” will be decided by evaluating the following Penn Central43 
factors: (1) The regulation’s economic impact on the claimant and the extent to which it has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (2) The character of the 
governmental action (e.g., whether it is a physical invasion or merely affects property interest).44 
Proposition 8 provides a corrective process to avoid an unconstitutional taking. This 
measure defines its revenue cap by formula, with adjustments to the formula possible only 
through a court challenge.45 The measure envisions the possibility that a CDC/governing entity 
might challenge the measure in court on the grounds that the rebate requirement is an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without due process or just compensation. If such a 
legal challenge is successful, the measure requires that the rebate provision still apply, but only 
after the court replaces the measure’s revenue cap with the lowest possible alternative (a ratio of 
specified costs higher than 115 percent) that would not be unconstitutional. The measure places 
the burden of identifying the alternative cap on the CDC/ governing entity. 
Proposition 8’s required rebate provisions arguably might affect an unconstitutional 
“taking of private property for public use without just compensation.”46 First, to determine what 
property is at issue, a court must determine whether there is a price control. Both sides of the 
initiative disagree as to whether the price cap is a price control. Proponents argue there is no 
price control because the measure is not limiting clinics to a certain price. On the other hand, 
opponents urge that revenue caps are a roundabout way of limiting the clinics pricing structure 
and results in a price control. Since the measure limits the price, a court will likely find there is 
an indirect price control in place.  
Under the per se or Penn Central47 factors, dialysis companies argue there is a taking. If 
dialysis companies can show that the rebate will deprive the clinics of all economic beneficial 
use of the clinic, forcing the clinics to close down, a court could find a per se violation of the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. If dialysis companies are unable to make a showing for a 
per se violation, a court will look to the Penn Central48 factors to determine if the required rebate 
provisions affect an unconstitutional taking.  
                                               
40 U.S. CONST., AMEND V;  U.S. CONST., AMEND XIV; Cal. Const., Art. I, § 19.  
41 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 US 528, 538, (2005).  
42 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).  
43 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
44 544 US at 538–539 (2005). 
45 Preliminary Opp. of RPIs, Messina v. Padilla, No. S248732, 2018 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 564, at *20. 
46 U.S. CONST., AMEND V;  U.S. CONST., AMEND XIV; Cal. Const., Art. I, § 19. 





First, a cap on dialysis clinics’ revenue and requiring any money above the cap to be 
rebated to private payers deprives clinics of profits and has the potential to force closure of 
clinics. Dialysis companies are businesses and expect to make a profit by running dialysis clinics 
in California. Limiting dialysis companies’ revenues interferes with the companies’ investment 
backed expectations because they would not be receiving the profits they expected to receive 
when entering into the dialysis business.  
Second, the measure would affect dialysis companies’ interest in profits above the 115 
percent revenue cap. Proponents argue that clinics can still make a 15% profit with the revenue 
caps. Moreover, proponents assert the revenue is not limited because the more money spent on 
“allowable costs” leads to more profits for clinics. Thus, the proponents say they are trying to 
incentivize clinics to spend more money on “direct patient care services” and “health care quality 
improvement”, which will improve the conditions of dialysis treatment in California.  
Ultimately, limiting clinics revenue effectively deprives clinics of their profit and 
supports a finding of a taking. Additionally, the text of Proposition 8 specifically provides a 
process in case an unconstitutional taking occurs.49 For these reasons, a court will likely find a 
taking.  
 
B. Due Process Challenge 
 
Under the due process guarantee, a regulated entity may not be compelled to absorb its 
own costs rather then pass them on to the consumers, but it also may not be allowed to pass on 
expenses incurred unnecessarily or for the purpose of expansion.50 Price control laws have the 
potential to limit the return that a member of the regulated community can realize on his or her 
investment to such a great extent that the law must provide a mechanism to guarantee a 
constitutionally required fair and reasonable return.51 For this reason, Court has required a 
mechanism for obtaining relief to avoid that unconstitutional result.52  Opponents argue that the 
measure would violate due process because it does not include an administrative procedure for 
rate review that would grant adequate remedy for relief.  
 
1. Administrative Procedure for Rate Review 
 
The lack of adequate administrative procedure for rate review if the rate is confiscatory 
would be the first due process challenge.  The mechanism for rate adjustment would guarantee 
CDCs receive fair and reasonable return if the revenue cap rate is too low and deprives them of 
fair return.   
Proponents have argued that “the state and federal constitutions impose no independent 
requirement that every economic regulation must be accompanied by an administrative 
procedure for seeking an individualized variance.”53 They cite Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano54 
                                               
49 Cal. Proposition 8 § 1226.7 (a)(6) (2018).  
50 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 2286. 
51 Guar. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1990). 
52 Id 
53 Messina v Padilla, Preliminary Opposition of Real Parties in Interest at 37. 
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to argue that there are no constitutional requirements that price controls must provide 
“individualized consideration and administrative relief.”  In Chevron v. Cayetano, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal approved a Hawaii statute that a set maximum rent that oil companies 
could collect.55  
Opponents counter that price control was acceptable in Chevron v. Cayetano because 
Chevron has two streams of revenue – rental revenue and earnings on Chevron gasoline sold 
through the stations, whereas CDCs and governing entities only operate one primary revenue 
stream – the provision of dialysis care – which is encompassed entirely by the restrictions of the 
Initiative.56 Opponents also point to Guar. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Gates, where a rate regulation was 
found unconstitutional because in part it did not “provide any mechanism to guarantee 
constitutionally required fair and reasonable return.”57 
The measure does provide a mechanism to review and adjust the revenue cap rate if it 
“violate[s] due process or effect a taking of private property requiring just compensation under 
that Constitution of this State or the Constitution of the United States.”58 If CDCs can prove in 
any court action that the measure would violate its due process rights, the CDC can propose a 
replacement revenue cap rate for the fiscal year in question, and must prove that any number 
below the proposed replacement rate would violate due process or effect a taking of private 
property.59  However, there is a question whether giving the court the power instead of an 
administrative agency is legitimate and constitutional.  If it is, then there exists an administrative 
procedure for rate review. 
  
2. Adequate Remedy for Relief from Confiscatory Rate 
 
Even if there is an administrative procedure for rate review, there is a question whether 
CDC can receive an adequate remedy from the administrative procedure.  On one hand, the CDC 
that might suffer a taking from the confiscatory rate could get relief in a court action.  However, 
the relief could only apply to the fiscal year in question.  If the CDC would need relief for a 
subsequent fiscal year, then it would have to file a civil action for each fiscal year in which it 
needs relief.   
Opponents also argue that CDCs are deprived of a fair return because the proposed 
definition of “direct patient care services costs” limits any future regulation of the Department 
that would prescribe other potential allowable costs. Specifically, the initiative defines “direct 
patient care service costs” as “only” those costs listed, which seems to limit the power of the 
CDPH to craft regulations that would expand the universe of allowable costs.60 The proponents 
argue that “categories of direct patient care services costs “may be further prescribed by the 
Department of Public Health through regulation.”61 Opponents counter that even if the 
                                                                                                                                                       
54 Id at 39. 
55 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). 
56 Messina v Padilla, Petitioners’ Reply to the Preliminary Opposition of Respondent and Real Parties in Interest at 
12.  
57 Guar. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1990). 
58 Cal. Proposition 8, § 1226.7(a)(6) (2018). 
59 Cal. Proposition 8 (2018). 




Department has authority to override the express limiting statutory language of “only,” and even 
if it includes additional costs left out by the initiative drafter, a CDC or governing entity faced 
with a confiscatory result is still unable to obtain relief in a circumstance where the state agency 
fails to do so, as required by law.62  
 
C. Separation of Powers 
 
Proposition 8 adds Section 1226.7(a)(6) to the Health and Safety Code, which directs a 
reviewing court to adjust the 115% number in a civil action and determine a proper replacement 
number.63 The proposition allows for such determination in civil cases which violate due process 
or effect a taking of private property requiring just compensation.64 Proposition 8’s proposed 
change to the Health and Safety Code raises a separation of powers issue because it directs the 
court to effectively rewrite the law and restricts the court's ability to issue a remedy by limiting 
the court to a remedy of a one-year modification of the price control.65  
The California Constitution states, “[t]he powers of state government are legislative, 
executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either 
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”66 Opponents argue that the initiative 
violates constitutional separation of powers in two main ways.  
First, opponents argue the initiative directs a court to determine the appropriate number 
over 115 percent. This results in the court effectively rewriting the law. Proponents argue the 
court is not rewriting the law. The court is only carrying out a process by which to preserve the 
constitutionality of the initiative. The court is not itself rewriting the law, but rather looking at 
the evidence and making a determination on whether a certain number constitutes a taking or 
violates due process.  
Second, opponents argue the initiative limits the court’s ability to issue a remedy after 
finding an unconstitutional taking or violation of due process because the initiative limits the 
remedy to one year. As a result, the opponents argue that the initiative “materially impairs” a 
court’s exercise of its constitutional power. Proponents argue the initiative process and 
legislative branch do not restrict the judiciary’s power to issue remedies. Courts act in an 
enforcement capacity, and enforce laws in other cases. In the same way, the court should follow 
Proposition 8 and issue the one year remedy.  In similar cases, administrative agencies are 
charged with carrying out this process and issuing remedies. Therefore, the judiciary can enforce 
the proposition and issue the specified one year remedy.  
In 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Garamendi,67, the California Supreme Court 
determined the “court is required to weigh the evidence in accordance with its independent 
judgment and then to sustain the order if it finds adequate evidentiary support and to strike it 
down if it does not.” In this case, the initiative requires the same judicial inquiry. As proponents 
                                               
62 Messina v. Padilla, No. S248732, 2018 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 564, at *30. 
63 Cal. Proposition 8 at § 3 (2018). 
64 Id. 
65 Cal. Proposition 8 at § 3 (2018). 
66 Cal. Const., art. III, § 3. 
67 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal.4th 216, 318 (1994).  
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argue, “the fact that the court will need to consider evidence regarding costs and revenues, and 
the economic impact of the initiative on a particular entity, in no way makes the matter somehow 
unsuitable for adjudication.”68 For these reasons, a challenge based on separation of powers 
grounds will likely be unsuccessful.  
 
D. California Constitution Article II, Section 12 
 
 The California Constitution states that “No amendment to the Constitution, and no statute 
proposed by the electors by the Legislature or by initiative, that names any individual to hold any 
office, or names or identifies any private corporation to perform any function or to have any 
power or duty, may be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”69 
Under Findings and Purposes, Proposition 8 states “In a market dominated by just two 
multinational companies, California must ensure that dialysis is fairly priced and affordable.” 
Although the language of the initiative did not specifically name the two companies, the 
campaign materials identified them as DaVita and Fresenius.70 The question is did the initiative 
identify these two companies to perform any function or to have any duty?  Two California 
appellate court cases could provide guidance. 
In Pala Band of Mission Indians v. Board of Supervisors 71, the initiative defined a 
specific private corporation as “Applicant,” and specified functions and duties that applicant had 
to perform in operating solid waste facility.  It was found to have violated the California 
Constitution’s prohibition on an initiative naming a private entity to perform any function or to 
have any power or duty.72 
In Hernandez v. Town of Apple Valley73, the Town of Apple Valley passed an initiative 
measure that allowed for a commercial development, which would include a Walmart 
Supercenter, and gave the developer duty to obtain the proper permits and approvals.74 Although 
the initiative did not specifically name Walmart, the ballot materials referenced Walmart.75 
Furthermore, some town residents and others knew the commercial development included a 
Walmart store.76 The California Court of Appeal found that, because the initiative did not name 
or identify Walmart and did not assign powers or duties to Walmart exclusively, it did not violate 
the California Constitution.77   
Between the two cases, Proposition 8 is most similar to Hernandez.  The language in the 
proposition referred to “two multinational companies,” which were clearly identified as DaVita 
and Fresenius in Yes On 8 campaign materials. However, the dialysis clinic companies were not 
                                               
68 Preliminary Opp. of RPIs, Messina v. Padilla, No. S248732, 2018 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 564, at *46. 
69 Cal. Const., art II, § 12. 
70 Fact Sheet, Yes on 8, available at,  https://www.yeson8.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fact-Sheet_Yes-On-
8_September.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) [“Yes on 8 Fact Sheet”].  
71 Pala Band of Mission Indians v. Bd. of Supervisors, 54 Cal. App. 4th 565, 570 (4th Dist. 1997). 
72 Id at 570. 
73 Hernandez v. Town of Apple Valley, 7 Cal. App. 5th 194, 196 (4th Dist. 2017). 
74 Id at 196. 
75 Id.  
76 Id at 203. 
77 Id at 213. 
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specifically named within the “four corners” of the initiative.  Therefore, similar to Hernandez, 
Proposition 8 would not likely violate the constitutional prohibition on an initiative to give a 
private entity power or duty.  Furthermore, if passed, Proposition 8 would affect the entire 
industry of chronic dialysis clinics and not just the two corporations.  Although the two 
corporations own 70% of the clinics at this time, the initiative, if passed, would have broader 
application on chronic dialysis clinics, not just the ones owned by the two corporations. 
 




 Proposition 8 contains a severability clause which allows provisions to be severed from 
any portions of the initiative that are invalidated.78   Although a severability clause establishes a 
presumption in favor of severance, it is not determinative.79  If a court finds that a provision of 
the Proposition 8 is unconstitutional, the court will apply a three-part test to determine whether 
the unconstitutional provision can be severed. For a provision to survive this test and be severed 
from the potential unconstitutional provisions, the California Supreme Court has explained that 
“the invalid provision must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.”80  First, a 
court will find grammatical severability if the invalid parts “can be removed as a whole without 
affecting the wording” or coherence of what remains.81  Second, the court will consider whether 
the remainder of the statute is functionally independent and “complete in itself.”82  Finally, the 
court will decide whether the voters would have adopted the rest of the act without the invalid 
portions.83   
Severability will be permitted if by eliminating some language in Proposition 8 the 
remaining provisions make sense, the remaining sections can exist independent of the offending 
provision and the electorate would have adopted the section remaining had they known the 
offending provision was a problem. If not, then the courts can nullify the measure in its entirety. 
If the valid provisions of the remaining statute are not severable, the entire measure becomes a 
nullity.84  
Section 1226.7(a) relating to issuing refunds for revenue above 115% of the costs of 
direct patient care and healthcare improvements is potentially invalid due to the constitutional 
issues that are described above. In fact, some amount of litigation on these issues has already 
occurred in a pre-election review challenge. If a court determines the revenue cap is an 
unconstitutional taking or violates due process, this section will be invalid.  
Section 1226.7(a)(6) which allows CDCs to petition the court to adjust the 115 percent is 
potentially unconstitutional because it violates due process. If it is to be found unconstitutional, 
this provision will be removed from the measure. The omission of section 1226.7 will eliminate 
                                               
78 Cal. Proposition 8 at § 9 (2018). 
79 California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 (2011).  
80 Id. 
81 Id at 271.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 People’s Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal.App.3d 316, 330 (1986). 
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the measure’s administrative process for rate review. Without a process for review, the 
remaining provisions may not be able to constitutionally function.    
Section 1226.7(a)(3) requires clinics to report all rebates issued to the department. 
Section 1226.7(a)(3) is grammatically severable because it is a section of its own. However, it is 
not functionally severable because its implementation relies on “a report of all rebates issued 
under paragraph (2)” in Section 1226.7(a)(2).  Since section 1226.7(a)(3) does not meet the 
functional requirement, we do not need to address the volitional element. 
Section 1226.7(b) requires chronic dialysis clinics to submit annual compliance reports to 
the department regarding clinic costs, patient charges, and revenue.  Section 1226.7(b) is 
potentially valid, but not severable from the preceding provisions. Section 1226.7(b) is 
grammatically severable because it is a section of its own. Section 1226.7(b) is not functionally 
severable because its implementation relies on reporting the issuing of refunds set forth in the 
preceding provision: Section 1226.7(b)(1)(H) refers to Section 1226.7(a)(2)(D) and Section 
1226.7(b)(4) refers to Section 1226.7(a)(3). Since section 1226.7(b) does not meet the functional 
requirement, we do not need to address the volitional element.  
Section 1226.8(a) prohibits clinics from refusing to treat patients based on the source of 
payment for care. This section is potentially valid and severable. Section 1226.8 is grammatically 
severable because it is a section in itself. Next, it is functionally severable because it can operate 
independent of the issuing of refunds and the reporting requirements. In determining volitional 
element, a court will consider whether the section (1) was significant in light of the stated 
purpose of the proposition, and (2) the attention of voters was sufficiently focused on the 
particular provision.85  The Attorney General of California included in the title and summary of 
the chief purpose and points of the proposed measure, “Prohibits clinics from discriminating 
against patients based on the source of payment for care.”86 The ballot’s argument urges voters to 
“Make patients the highest priority” and “vote yes on Prop. 8 and tell dialysis companies to 
prioritize lifesaving treatment for patients over corporate profits.”87 The Yes on 8 campaign 
materials highlight “Overcharging drives up costs for all Californians” and specifically, 
“California dialysis companies charge patients with private insurance an average $150,000 for a 
year of dialysis treatment — a 350% markup from the cost of providing care!”88  The 
Proposition’s title and summary, campaign materials, and ballot arguments stress the issue of 
increased costs for patients based on the source of payment for care. For these reasons, the 
volitional element is met. 
In conclusion, if the Section 1226.7 is held invalid as an unconstitutional taking or a 
violation of due process, since Section 1226.8 meets all three requirements, it will likely be 
severed. Thus, Section 1226.8 would be valid and enforced on its own. 
 
B. Defective Petition  
 
In a pre-election review, opponents raised two instances where the initiative petition 
presented to voters violated the mandatory provisions of the Elections Code.   First, the petition 
                                               
85 California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, 53 Cal.4th 231, 271 (2011). 
86 See NOVEMBER 2018 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2. 
87 Id. 
88 Yes on 8 Fact Sheet. 
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stated that the measure would “propose amendments to the Health and Safety Code and 
Corporation Code, relating to fair pricing of healthcare.” The measure only amends the Health 
and Safety Code. Opponents argued that the initiative petition was unclear about the legal codes 
it was amending. In particular, the petition says in one place that the proposed initiative amends 
the Corporations Code and in another place it does not. Second, the petition used regular type 
instead of boldface in the title and summary. This would be inconsistent with Election Code 
§9008 that states “circulating title and summary prepared by the Attorney General” should be 
placed on the petition “in 12-point or larger roman boldface type.”  Opponents asserted “the 
deviation from the petition format requirements here thwarted the Legislature's objective to 
ensure that every petition presented to the voters provides clear and accurate information 
concerning its contents.”89  
On June 13, 2018, the Supreme Court of California rejected the pre-election review 
challenge to remove Proposition 8 from the November ballot.90  Andrea Messina, executive 
director of the California Dialysis Council, and Patient and Caregivers to Protect Dialysis 
Patients filed the dismissed petition against the Secretary of State, Alex Padilla.91 In the holding, 
the Supreme Court of California denied the petition for writ of mandate and denied the 
application for stay without comment.92  
Proponents argued that “the initiative petition’s erroneous mention of changes to the 
Corporations Code and its use of regular rather than boldface type in part of the title and 
summary” are minor technical mistakes and the “errors would not likely have misled the voters 
who signed the petition.”  Proponents seem to argue that substantial compliance is sufficient.  In 
the Reply Brief, opponents reject Real Parties view that substantial compliance is sufficient in 
this case and argued strict compliance is essential.93 
In Costa v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court found that despite the discrepancies 
between the initiative version submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated for 
signature, there was “substantial compliance with these requirements.” 94  The court reasoned 
that discrepancies did not “mislead the public or otherwise frustrate or undermine the purposes 
underlying any of the applicable constitutional or statutory provisions or threaten the integrity of 
the electoral process.95   
It is not surprising based on Costa, that the California Supreme Court in the pre-election 
challenge did not remove Proposition 8 from the ballot. It is very likely that if the issues are 
raised again post-election, the California Supreme Court will conclude that the technical errors in 
the petition were not sufficiently defective to mislead the signatories, nor would the errors 
threaten the integrity of the electoral process.  Signatories would have most likely paid more 
                                               
89 Messina v. Padilla, No. S248732, 2018 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 564, at *2. 
90 Kelly Gooch, California high court rejects attempt to remove dialysis initiative from November ballot,  Becker’s 
Hospital Review (June 19, 2018). https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-issues/california-high-
court-rejects-attempt-to-remove-dialysis-initiative-from-november-ballot.html.  
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13_SupremeCourtOrder_DeniesDialysisIndustryRequest.pdf  
93 Messina v. Padilla, No. S248732, 2018 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 564, at *15. 




attention to the substance of the initiative as opposed to the specific code stated that it was 
changing.  A reasonable person would also be able to read the petition despite that it is in regular 
type as opposed to bold-type, because it is still a readable font size. 
 
VII. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A. Supporting Arguments 
 
Proponents are concerned that big corporate dialysis providers are making billions of 
dollars by overcharging these critically ill patients. Proponents of Proposition 8 believe it will 
provide strong incentives for dialysis companies to lower costs and improve quality of care. 
Dialysis corporation revenues will be limited to “no more than 15% above the amount they 
spend on patient care.”96  By linking revenue to care, dialysis corporations will have stronger 
incentives to invest in patient care.97 When dialysis clinics overcharge patients for treatment, 
insurance companies are forced to pass the costs to all policyholders.98   This drives up costs for 
all Californians. If we stop dialysis companies from overcharging, we can bring down the cost of 
healthcare premiums for all Californians.99    
Additionally, proponents argue that California dialysis clinics lack sanitation and hygiene 
and are extremely unsanitary, with blood stains, cockroaches, and dirty bathrooms reported at 
dialysis clinics.100  These poor conditions can contribute to high infection rates.101 Further, 
patients in low income communities face additional difficulties of being treated with outdated 
equipment in facilities often located in run-down strip malls.102  Limiting the amount of revenue 
for dialysis companies to 115% of patient care, will incentivize clinics to spend more money on 
patient care which will include improving the sanitation condition of the clinics.  
As of September 18, 2018, Proposition 8 supporters had raised over $17.4 million. 
Among those supporters are SEIU-United Healthcare Workers West, contributing $17,387,341 
and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 617, contributing 
$2,500.103  
 
B. Opponents Main Arguments 
 
Opponents of Proposition 8 argue that the proposed initiative would set reimbursement 
rates too low and at a level that does not cover the actual costs of providing care.104 In addition, 
opponents are concerned the definition of “patient care services costs” excludes critical staff and 
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necessary services105 required by federal regulators for operating a clinic.106   Clinics could only 
recover 69% of their operating costs, forcing closures or major cutbacks.  Their argument is 
further supported by a report by the Berkeley Research Group that found that 83% of dialysis 
clinics in California would operate at a loss.  Opponents claim as dialysis clinics shut down, 
patients would be forced to seek regular treatment or treatment for complications in more 
expensive hospital Emergency Rooms. The measure would lead to potentially hundreds of 
millions of dollars in higher costs for Medi-Cal and Medicare to treat dialysis patients.107 
As of September 18, 2018, Proposition 8 opponents had raised $53.3 million. Among 
those contributing to the opposition party are DaVita, contributing $27,987,686, Fresenius 
Medical Care North America, contributing $18,520,100, U.S. Renal Care, contributing 
$2,954,397, California Republican Party, contributing $2,150,000, and Satellite Healthcare, Inc., 
contributing $500,000.108  
 
C. Fiscal Considerations 
 
The overall annual effect on state and local governments could range from net positive 
impact in the low tens of millions of dollars to net negative impact in the tens of millions of 
dollars.109  There are two sources of uncertainty. First, it is uncertain which costs are 
allowable.110 Although the measure defines allowable costs, it is unclear for instance if staff costs 
for certain managerial staff that also provide direct patient care are allowable costs.111 
Consequently, it would also be uncertain how CDCs would respond to the measure.112 
Depending on how broad or narrow the interpretation of the allowable costs, CDCs may respond 
with modest or significant changes to their cost structure (for example: increase their allowable 
costs, reduce other costs, seek adjustments to the revenue cap, or scale back operations).113 If the 
allowable costs are interpreted broadly, the amount of rebates CDCs are required to pay would 
be smaller.114  CDCs would likely respond with modest changes to their cost structures.115 This 
would result in lower state and local government costs for employee health benefits, and an 
overall net positive impact on state and local government finances in the low tens of millions of 
dollars annually.116 On the other hand, if allowable costs are interpreted narrowly, the amount of 
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rebates would be greater.117 CDCs would likely respond with significant changes to their costs 
structures. This could potentially lead to increase in state and local government costs for 




 Proposition 8 would impose limits on charges for patient care by chronic dialysis clinics.  
If passed, chronic dialysis clinics would have to rebate to non-government payers the amounts 
charged in excess of the “fair treatment payment amount” as defined in proposed initiative. 
CDCs would be required to report to the State information required to enforce to measure. CDCs 
would also be prohibited from refusing to treat patients based on the source of payment for care. 
 The pre-election review of the proposed initiative identified potential drafting and 
constitutional issues. While the Supreme Court of California allowed Proposition 8 to remain on 
the ballot, it did so without comment on the validity of the constitutional issues.  So the issues 
may still be litigated in a post-election challenge, if Proposition 8 passes.   
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